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ABSTRACT
LIGHT WEIGHT ENCRYPTION BASED SECURITY PACKAGE FOR
WIRELESS BODY AREA NETWORK
SANGWON SHIN
2021
As the demand of individual health monitoring rose, Wireless Body Area
Networks (WBAN) are becoming highly distinctive within health applications.
Nowadays, WBAN is much easier to access then what it used to be. However, due to
WBAN’s limitation, properly sophisticated security protocols do not exist. As WBAN
devices deal with sensitive data and could be used as a threat to the owner of the data or
their family, securing individual devices is highly important. Despite the importance in
securing data, existing WBAN security methods are focused on providing light weight
security methods. This led to most security methods for WBAN providing partial security
protocols, which left many possibilities in compromising the system.
This paper proposes full security protocol designed for wireless body area
networks consisting of light weight data encryption, authentication, and re-keying
methods. Encryption and authentication use a modified version of RSA Encryption called
PSRSA, developed to be used within small systems such as WBAN. Authentication is
performed by using encryption message authentication code (E-MAC) using PSRSA. Rekeying is performed with a method called tokening method. The experiment result and
security analysis showed that the proposed approach is as light as the leading WBAN
authentication method, ECC authentication, while preventing more attacks and providing
smaller communication size which fulfills the highest NIST Authentication Assurance
Level (AAL).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) are small-scale networks centered on a
human body [1]. WBANs consist of sensors or devices used for monitoring and
transmitting physiological signals to specialized medical servers [2, 3]. With WBAN, it is
possible to continuously monitor the patient’s medical status and in doing so, WBAN
reduces risk of critical situations by detecting any change with attached sensors so the
doctor may take the necessary actions to maintain the patient’s life [4]. Since WBAN
deals with life dependent data, it requires reliable, trustworthy, and secure data gathering
[5]. However, security and privacy issues exist in real application of WBANs [6]. This
happens because information is transmitted wirelessly in an open channel, leading to
vulnerabilities and threats [7].
To overcome security and privacy issues within WBAN, security methods must
be implemented; however, a properly sophisticated security method does not exist within
WBAN. [8]. As WBAN is also a type of computer system, using existing security method
could be a solution, but as there are existing limitations on WBAN due to its size,
existing security methods cannot be directly implemented without any modifications.
Well known limitations in WBANs are power, memory, computational capability, and
communication rate [9, 10]. Because of such limitations, instead of applying one or two
security methodologies, it is best to apply protocols [11]. Protocols are packages of
multiple security methods that can be applied to networks, and by doing so, it is possible
to enhance the security of networks. To ensure the level of security within protocols,
there is a guideline from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
called Authentication Insurance Level (AAL) [12]. AAL are set in 3 levels with AAL-3
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as highest level. To satisfy AAL-3, security protocols are required with following
security methods: Authentication, Cryptography, Cryptographic key exchange protocol
and resistance to attacks of Man in the Middle (MitM), Verifier Impersonation, VerifierCompromise, Replay resistance, and Authentication Intent [12]. The use of multiple
security protocols is necessary to satisfy AAL-3 since there are no single security method
that can defend from them all.
Because of limitations within WBAN, it is challenging to apply full protocols, and
as such, most research proposes applying a lighter version of the existing security method.
This fulfills the AAL-2 security level, however there are a handful of AAL-3 satisfying
methods. The most common approach to apply is modifying Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) because of its lightness and high security assurance. As ECC is more suited for
authentication over encryption, to maintain the security level high enough, it requires use
of other security methods as well. [13]. Because of this, proposing AAL-2 satisfying
security methods were preferred than AAL-3 satisfying security methods. However,
AAL-2 is considered the minimum level of security, and most networks require having
AAL-3 for confident protection [12]. To satisfy AAL-3, instead of using ECC, the most
popular method in WBAN, which only provides authentication method, using encryption
method with Message Authentication Code (MAC) allows both authentication,
encryption, and also secure key exchange protocol. In this paper, I propose security
protocol for WBAN composed with PSRSA and token-based rekeying (TOKEN-PSRSA)
which satisfies AAL-3.
The rest of paper is organized as: Background, Related work, Methods, Results and
evaluation including security analysis and conclusion.
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II.

BACKGROUND

2.1 WIRELESS BODY AREA NETWORK
WBAN is referred to as a network formed with small sensor devices positioned
on the body to collect medical data from user [1]. WBAN can be placed on various places
of body to collect necessary data using medical sensors. This collected data will be sent
to hospital or medical specialist, allowing them to monitor patients medical condition
continuously, to aid specialists in specifying the health condition of the patient more
closely or to detect emergency situation such as sudden heart attack or stroke [2]. Not
only within health monitoring, use of WBAN is expanding rapidly also in multiple fields
such as athlete training in monitoring athlete’s performance, and armed forces in
monitoring the troops’ status. WBAN became more available to the public recently;
smart watches and electronic sports monitoring bands are types of WBAN available in
the market for anyone to purchase. Figure 1 shows the basics of WBAN formation with
multiple sensor device, intermediate server and specialist to analyze the collected data
such as doctors or hospitals.

Figure 1. Wireless Body Area Network
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To be able to place sensors free of wires for WBAN, usually each sensor requires
a small computing board with it such as Microchip, Microcontrollers or even FPGA.
These are small computing board size from less than few millimeters to 10cm. Because
of such size, there are various limitations, such as low in computation power, low in
memory size, and low in communication power [9, 10]. Depending on purpose, WBAN’s
can select the computing board from 3 different level of computations: Low, Medium,
and High. Computation and size of the computing board get larger by higher computation
levels and higher costs. Requirement of computation levels differs by the purpose of
sensors as following:
1. Low computational
Nodes with low computational power are used for sensors to collect data with low
frequency and disposable sensors such as blood glucose sensors. Such nodes are
considered to have microchip for gathering and sending data to intermediate node that
collects all the data’s prior to sending to server.
2. Medium computational
Nodes with medium computational power are used with sensors required in collecting
data frequently such as pulse sensor, temperature, and others. Following nodes are
considered to have computational power and size comparable of micro controllers,
authentication, encryption, and decryption, which allows enough computation to
handle gathering and storing of the data. Intermediate node also falls with medium
computational nodes and gathers data from multiple sensors and sends it to High
computational node for further processing.
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3. High computational
Nodes with high computational power are used in storing data and processing it for
final use. High computational node considers having computation power of regular
PC, such as a laptop.
With the 3 given computational levels, most WBANs are formed in star topology. As
shown in figure 2, star topology transmits all data to the central node, or the intermediate
node, then the intermediate node transfers sanitized data to workstation. Using star
topology allows individual sensors to use less power on communication and storing data
and by limiting the long-distance communication allows to minimize the security
compromise by use of open wireless transmission, making this approach as the most
common approach taken within WBAN [14].
Sensor Nodes
Intermediate Node
Workstation

Figure 2. Simple star topology example
In this paper, TOKEN-PSRSA takes a similar star topology form as figure 2 shows.
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2.2 SECURITY THREATS
Understanding security threats are important in understanding why security
matters in WBAN, and why existing methods for WBAN are not secure enough.
Major attack scenarios and how to handle it in WBAN are shown on table 1.

Table 1: Major attack scenarios in WBAN
Each threat shown in table 1 is critical for WBAN. Unauthenticated access
will allow fake nodes to send and receive patient’s data. Message disclosure can
conflict the server to modify patient’s status and can show that the patient is not in
danger even if they are in peril. Denial of Service and flooding attacks can fill up
memory of WBAN which results in halting the system or physically damaging the
sensors. Threats scenario showed in table 1 falls into the following network threat
categories:
Physical (Jamming, Tampering), Link (Collision, Unfairness, Exhaustion), Network
(neglect and greed, Homing, Misdirection) and finally, transport (Flooding,
Desynchronization). From these attacks, the goal of security in WBAN is to preserve
Data confidentiality, data integrity and data freshness. Each represents how secure
the data is, how trustworthy the data is, and finally how new the data is. By keeping
these three categories from specified attacks, it is possible to keep WBAN secure [8].
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2.3 DATA AUTHENTICATION AND ENCRYPTION
To satisfy NIST AAL-3, it is important to satisfy data authentication, encryption,
and protection against certain attacks. Authentication is a method to grant or deny the
access of incoming transmission. Through authentication, the device is required to prove
that it is allowed to transmit within the network. Authentication is an important step to
block any unwanted transmissions. There are multiple authentication methods; however,
the TOKEN-PSRSA uses MAC with Encryption. MAC is a simple way of performing
authentication. Once authentication is required from the receiver, the sender has to send
MAC. Once the receiver receives MAC, it will compare with MAC it has. When the sent
MAC matches with MAC that the receiver has, MAC will grant the sender access to the
network. Because it is simple, this process does not require much computation power.
However, to prevent MAC getting hijacked in the middle of transmission, MAC is
required to be encrypted. There are many encryption methods that one can apply to create
E-MAC; however, with proposed method, I have chosen to use RSA encryption.
RSA is one common encryption that is widely used within many forms of
networks [15]. However, it is considered as not suitable to be used within WBAN,
because RSA requires key size more than 1024 bit to be secure, which means RSA is
heavy in size [15, 16]. Original RSA is Asymmetric encryption, meaning RSA has
separate encryption and decryption key. Encryption keys are sent to the public, but the
encryption keys cannot be used to decrypt the message. Decryption keys are kept secret,
and are called private keys. Because of this method, RSA can be used to encrypt against
multiple sender and single receiver while sender cannot use their key to decrypt what
anyone in network sent to the receiver. RSA is widely used since most network servers
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are formed in multiple senders to a single receiver. Figure 3 explains process of RSA
encryption. First using public key, sender encrypts the data with public key. Once the
data is encrypted, this will be sent to receiver. Receiver will then use a private key to
decrypt the RSA encrypted data. Public keys are open keys sent out by the receiver, and
private key is a secret key only kept by the receiver.

Figure 3. How RSA Encryption Works
RSA encrypts the data using modular exponent calculation. Encryption equation of RSA
is as follows:

Table 2: RSA variable appendix
𝑐 = 𝑚𝑒 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛)
Equation 1: RSA Encryption [17]
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to generate encryption key, the following equation is used:
𝜆(𝑛) = 𝑙𝑐𝑚(𝑝 − 1, 𝑞 − 1)
Equation 2: Encryption key generation [17]
Where prime number p and q cannot be equal number, and exponent e in Equation 1 must
satisfy gcd(𝜆(𝑛), 𝑒) = 1; 1 < e < 𝜆(𝑛) to be able to decrypt [17].
To decrypt the RSA encrypted data, following equation will be used:
𝑚 = 𝑐 𝑑 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛)
Equation 3: RSA Decryption [17]
where decryption key d is determined using exponent and prime number used to encrypt
as following:
𝑒 ∗ 𝑑 = 1 ∗ 𝑚𝑜𝑑((𝑝 − 1) ∗ ( 𝑞 − 1))
Equation 4: Decryption key generation [17]
Figure 4 shows actual RSA encryption and decryption process

Figure 4. RSA Encryption Decryption Example
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2.4 SECURITY PROTOCOL
To be able to secure WBAN with satisfying NIST AAL-3, WBAN requires
security protocol [11]. Security protocol is the series of security methods gathered,
forming one package. For example, security protocol can be formed with authentication
and encryption. Use of multiple security protocols allows for enhanced security over
using single security method, since each security method has weaknesses. Security
protocol are formed to cover each security methods’ weakness, which results in providing
secure networks. Within WBAN, there are not many proper security protocols proposed,
and because of this, many proposed protocols have multiple weaknesses which allows for
systems to be compromised. In the proposed method, Security protocol are formed with
MAC Authentication, PSRSA Encryption, and Token based re-keying method. By
providing 3 security methodology, it is possible to satisfy NIST AAL-3 requirement
which assures secureness of proposed protocol.
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III.

RELATED WORK

There exist multiple threats that can compromise WBAN, and before
implementing security methods, it is important to understand what the threats for WBAN
are.
Niksaz et al [18] proposed possible threats and attacks for WBAN with possible
counter measures. Niksaz has defined attack layers and multiple scenarios of possible
attacks on WBAN, which can be used to check that the security methods are secure
against attack scenarios. There are multiple ways to secure WBAN. Most common
approach taken is to use ECC and implement authentication. Izza et al [7] proposed
WBAN with ECC. In this model MAC is used along ECC and has resistance to replay
attack and Denial of Service (DoS). Kumar et al [19] proposed secure authentication
protocol using ECC and SHA hash function. There are multiple other ECC based
methodologies to secure WBAN, because ECC is light and has strong security. However,
ECC is an authentication method rather than an encryption method. Because of this, ECC
requires separate encryption methods to secure the data transmission. Other common
proposed approach is using Zero Knowledge Proving (ZKP). Ma et al [20] proposes a
TinyZKP, a lightweight protocol of ZKP for authentication. ZKP is used to encrypt the
secret information of SHA-1. However, ZKP requires multiple communications to gain
authentication, since ZKP requires self-proving based on questions asked by server,
which results in higher communication cost.
While ECC and ZKP are common methods to provide security to WBAN, RSA is
a very rare selection for WBAN because the size of RSA is heavy in memory and
computation. However, RSA can provide both authentication using MAC and data
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encryption, while both ECC and ZKP can used for authentication but not for encryption.
Using RSA in WBAN is rare but it is possible. Chang et al [16] proposed a partial RSA
signature scheme based on periodical re-keying for wireless sensor networks. To reduce
the size of RSA to fit into WBAN, key size has been reduced, while using re-keying
method allowed to keep security level. In this method, RSA Key is rekeyed per time T.
Both WBAN and Server hold pools of pre-implemented small keys and change keys,
however once the keys are all used, the following protocol re-uses the previously used
keys which leads to security weakness. Aarti et al [21] proposed hybrid models for use in
clustered WBAN. This method uses RSA and SHA together. Most of the proposed
methods above can satisfy NIST AAL-2, however because most of them are partial
security packages, they cannot achieve NIST AAL-3 and there are numerous weaknesses
to compromise the network.
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IV.

METHODS

TOKEN-PSRSA is formed with 2 main parts. The first part is PSRSA, and the
second is token-like rekeying protocol using PSRSA. Combining two methods allows the
satisfaction of the NIST AAL-3 security level. To evaluate the protocol, simulation has
been taken using 5 Arduino microcontrollers with choice of electromyography, flex,
temperature and pulse sensors to simulate performance of the protocol within real life
usage.

Flex sensor node

EMG sensor node

Temperature
sensor node

Pulse
sensor node

Figure 5. Sensor placement on body simulation for evaluating protocol in real life
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4.1 PREPROCESSED SYMMETRIC RSA
Applying RSA encryption, to currently existing WBAN nodes composed of
microcontrollers, requires modification due to WBANs limitations [9, 10]. However,
simply reducing the size of RSA results in lowering the security level [16]. To avoid
lowering security level, proposed method adds preprocessing layer in front of RSA. Due
to the asymmetric method of RSA, and the size of key, communication costs are not very
effective since asymmetric requires public key distribution [8]. To reduce the
communication cost, simply implementing key generation processes into sensor nodes
allows the nodes to generate encryption keys. Doing so is also important to perform rekeying protocol to maintain security level.
Adding preprocessing layers will promise the increase of security, with the cost of
more computational power. To avoid such problems, algorithms used in preprocessing
layers require having lower computation time than RSA encryption and decryption. By
doing so, we can maintain computation time of RSA with smaller keys and still maintain
required security levels to secure the network. Preprocessing layers are composed with
added mix key, padding message, and bit shifting or bit operation. PSRSA allows choice
of preprocessing by bit shifting or bit operation. This leads to an increase of possible
combinations, which results in an increase of security level. Mix key layer has 256-bit
unique key that is pre-implemented in nodes, and uses this key to mix into message. Once
the message is mixed, mixed message will be then sent to the padding phase. The
padding phase will pad the message with pre-implemented padding pattern. Once
message is padded, based on the user’s choice, PSRSA will perform bit shifting or
reversable bit operation such as XOR, NOT or XNOR. Once preprocessing of message is
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over, then it will be sent to Symmetric RSA to be encrypted. The encrypted message will
be then sent over to an intermediate node, which decrypts it exactly the opposite of
PSRSA encryption.
Since PSRSA is an encryption methodology, it is possible to use it as
authentication with MAC. Using MAC will go through the same process with data, with
the only difference being encrypting data or authentication code. Because we have one
encryption method for both data encryption and authentication, this allows us to have a
full security package while maintaining the small size of the security package compared
to other methods such as ZKP or ECC, since both ZKP and ECC cannot be used for data
encryption while RSA can be used in both. Figure 6 shows logic flow of PSRSA with
MAC for authentication

Figure 6. PSRSA flow for Authentication
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Figure 7 shows a detailed overlook of PSRSA logic flow between sensor and
intermediate node. Once authentication is requested, intermediate node asks sensor to
provide the authentication key. Using pre-implemented information, sensor now encrypts
authentication message using PSRSA and sends it to the intermediate node. When the
intermediate node receives PSRSA encrypted key, it will send grant message to sensor.
Once the sensor is granted to transmit data, the sensor sends encrypted data using PSRSA
to the intermediate node and the intermediate node will decrypt and store the received
data.

Figure 7. PSRSA MAC and Data transfer communication order
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4.2 RE-KEYING PROTOCOL
Using PSRSA provides both authentication and data encryption. However,
PSRSA carries the same weakness of RSA. To secure the network further requires rekeying. Re-keying the PSRSA encryption and decryption key will enhance the security
levels, allowing for network security. Re-keying requires sending new key information
from intermediate node to sensor. However, when a new key information is sent through
the wireless networks, the key is then opened, resulting in neutralizing security of the
entire network. We can prevent such a problem by encrypting new key generating
information with PSRSA which allows safe re-keying method. To do so, both sensor and
intermediate require having pre-made master key purposed to decrypt only new key
generating information as needed.

Figure 8. Rekeying protocol overlooks
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As shown on figure 8, when sensor sends expired encryption key, instead of a grant
message, it sends a new encryption key that has been encrypted with PSRSA using
master key. Once the sensor decrypts the new key using master key, the previous key will
be overwritten with the new encryption key and be re-sent with it. To perform rekeying in
proposed manner, protocol requires a way to expire the old key. One common approach
is trying to synchronize two device using timestamps. However, the synchronization of
two devices has a high computation cost. To be able to expire the old key, TOKENPSRSA uses web tokening approach like the approach of Jason Web Token.
Tokening allows us to renew the information without synchronizing. Tokening is
defined as encrypted key including data and changeable information like session or
timestamp. Because the tokening key requires encryption, re-generated key will be kept
secret. TOKEN-PSRSA re-generates a key by taking the previous key, mixing it with
randomly generated simple session in intermediate node and the timestamp of key
generation. Intermediate node keeps the timestamp of the generated key and will expire
the key once the expiration time is over. Every time a key generates it has a new session
and a new timestamp, resulting in a new key; and since the old key will not be in use
anymore, tokening can prevent many security attacks.

Figure 9. Rekey generation in TOKEN-PSRSA
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V.

RESULTS AND EVALUATION

To simulate and prove the TOKEN-PSRSA is a protocol that fits and satisfies
AAL-3, TOKEN-PSRSA has been implemented into an Arduino feather micro-controller
with the following specs: 80Mhz clock speed, 4MB Storage, 50KB Memory with
ESP8266 communication module on board. The following microcontroller will be
considered a node with medium computation level and communication power, which is
consistent for most of the nodes that WBAN networks are composed of. Using microcontrollers, WBAN is formed in star-shaped network. Figure 10 below shows the basic
structure of star shaped network for TOKEN-PSRSA.

Figure 10. Star shaped network for TOKEN-PSRSA
All sensor nodes are required to communicate to hub node, and to communicate from low
computation nodes. Because of its limited computation and communication power, low
computation nodes are required to communicate with medium computation power nodes.
Medium computation node will transmit the information sent from low computation node
and pass it through to the Hub node with PSRSA data encryption. Once hub nodes gain
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enough information from sensor nodes, hub nodes will follow TOKEN-PSRSA protocol
and send the chunk of information to server.
Using the network above, TOKEN-PSRSA had tests to check its availability for
use in WBAN and performed simulation for attack scenarios to check its durability and
satisfy the AAL3. Availability simulation was taken with the following durations and
running full protocol including TOKEN based re-keying: Short term of 10 minutes, Long
term of 2 hours and 1 day continuously running authentication. In the availability
simulations, there were no authentication failures or memory overflow issues.
Subsequently, it is possible to conclude proposed protocol, TOKEN-PSRSA, is fit for
WBAN with star shape.
Through simulation, TOKEN-PSRSA has proven as fit to be used for WBAN.
However, there is still a need to evaluate the security assurance of the proposed protocol.
To do so, providing the theoretical and mathematically proven data is necessary. It also
must perform attacks on the networks to prove the immunity on certain attacks to satisfy
AAL-3. First, security attack simulation was taken to the network with protocol for one
week using laptop PC with Core-i7 CPU. Types of attack performed are followed by
NIST AAL guideline [12] and specified result per attack will be shown in the table below.
Figure 11 below shows the attack simulation to network with brute force on
authentication key based on man-in-the-middle scenario, and Figure 12 shows the
message flooding attack
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Figure 11. MitM attack simulation on TOKEN-PSRSA

Figure 12. Memory Flooding attack simulation on TOKEN-PSRSA
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To ensure the security level of TOKEN-PSRSA protocol is reached to the
expectation, security analysis has been taken as a proof of theoretical and mathematical
assurance for the protocol. Proposed model depends heavily on having high security level
with PSRSA. Encryption, depending on how many possible combinations exist, shows
how secure the algorithm is [22]. PSRSA generated combinations can be calculated using
following equation 5:
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =

2𝑛𝑘
∗ 6 ∗ 𝑠𝑏 ∗ 𝑘𝑏 ∗ 𝑃(𝑘𝑏, 94)
ln (2𝑛𝑘 )

Equation 5. Possible combination calculation for PSRSA
Within equation 5, nk represents the number of digits, 6 as number of bit shifting and bit
operation candidate possible to choose, sb as size of bit key used for bit operations, kb as
the bit size of mix key, taking permutation will give result for possible candidate of
characters from 94 characters in ASCII code.
Along with combination calculation, determining security level is required to prove the
security level. RSA family security level is calculated with General Number Field Sieve
(GNFS) as shown in equation 6.
3

𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑆𝐴 = exp ( √

1
2
64
+ 𝑂(1)) (ln(𝑛))3 ∗ (ln(ln(𝑛))3 )
9

Equation 6. RSA Security level calculation using GNFS [6]
Using the equation above, we can derive PSRSA possible combinations and compare
with other RSA based method and ECC, the most commonly used method in WBAN for
security.
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Table 3. Total combination and size comparison
Comparing Key size, PSRSA was able to reduce from 1024 bit to 256 bit from original
RSA and able to maintain security level of 80 bits. PSRSA was able to have total
combination of 10372 which is higher than original RSA and ECC with same security
level. PSRSA total combination is very close to 1024 bit RSA with SHA.
Next, we compare the communication cost of the entire protocol based on roundtrip length. Round-trip length shows how many bits are required to gain authentication.

Table 4. Comparison of communication length of round trip with ECC protocols
Compared to other ECC protocols for WBAN, TOKEN-PSRSA has significantly less
communication cost based on comparing communication length. This is because RSA
does not require much information to be encrypted or to be decrypted, and because ECC
requires multiple information requests to process authentication.
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Another important factor to consider for protocol is execution time within WBAN.
To calculate the TOKEN-PSRSA execution time in milli-second, Kilinc et al [28]
calculation model is used. Table 5 shows the computation time calculation table.

Table 5. Kilinc’s computation time calculation table [28]
Using Kilinc’s computation time calculation table, TOKEN-PSRSA will have following
equation:
𝑇𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑁 − 𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑆𝐴: 4𝐻 + 2𝑆𝑉𝐸𝑅 + 2𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑃 + 2𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑃 + 2𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶 = 15.79 𝑚𝑠
Equation 7. Kilinc’s computation time calculation for TOKEN-PSRSA
Adopting the table above for ECC results in 13ms. TOKEN-PSRSA is only 2ms slower
compare to most used method for authentication. However, Kilinc’s model is suitable to
encryption methods, and as ECC is an authentication method; adopting Kilinc’s table
may produce error.
Another calculation method to apply is Khan et al [23] calculation model.
Table 6 shows Khan’s execution time calculation model.
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Table 6. Khan’s execution time calculation model [23]
Within Table 6, ECC-based multiplication and point addition has same algorithm with
regular multiplication and point addition, allowing for the calculation of TOKEN-PSRSA
execution time. Using Table 6, we get following equations for TOKEN-PSRSA:
𝑇𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑁 − 𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑆𝐴 𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸𝑅: 𝑇𝐴 + 2𝑇𝐼 + 𝑇𝑀 + 𝑇𝐸 + 2𝑇𝑆𝑀 = 0.949 𝑚𝑠
𝑇𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑁 − 𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑆𝐴 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑂𝑅: 2 ∗ (𝑇𝐴 + 2𝑇𝐼 + 𝑇𝑀 + 𝑇𝐸 + 2𝑇𝑆𝑀 ) = 1.898 𝑚𝑠
By adding two worst case execution time calculated, results show TOKEN-PSRSA has
2.85ms according to Khan’s execution time calculation model. Table 7 has comparison of
computation cost between ECC methods. Most ECC based methods have similar or
slower execution times than TOKEN-PSRSA.

Table 7. Computation cost comparison with ECC using Khan’s model
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The last element to analyze before concluding the safeness and efficiency of
TOKEN-PSRSA for WBAN is comparing what kind of attacks are preventable. To
satisfy NIST AAL-3, protocol requires immunity to attacks specified in guideline [12].
Using scenarios proposed in guideline and categorization for WBAN threats, Table 8
below is generated.

Table 8. Attack Immunity comparison between ECC methods and TOKEN-PSRSA
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VI.

CONCLUSION

WBAN is a rapidly growing technology because of its convenience and
possibilities for monitoring patient’s health data at any time [8]. WBAN deals with life
critical data and privacy which requires security methods [6]. However, within WBAN,
there is not a properly sophisticated security method in existence [8]. Limitations to the
use of existing security methods are WBAN’s limitation on power, memory,
computational capability, and communication rate [9, 10]. To ensure secureness of
WBAN requires modifying existing security methods and acquiring NIST AAL-3 [12].
This paper proposed TOKEN-PSRSA, a security package composed with authentication,
encryption, and re-keying. Key component of protocol is RSA encryption modified to be
symmetric RSA with preprocessing layer, PSRSA and E-MAC authentication using
PSRSA. TOKEN-PSRSA have proven efficient in speed and in size, along with
immunity to multiple cyber-attacks using calculation and threats simulation. Results of
analysis and simulation shows TOKEN-PSRSA satisfies NIST AAL-3.
Even though TOKEN-PSRSA is aimed for network security within WBAN, it
could also be applied to other small systems. Since TOKEN-PSRSA protocol satisfies the
NIST AAL-3 assurance level within small systems such as WBAN, the possibility of
applying the same protocol to secure the other types of small system networks is possible
throughout multiple other applications such as Internet of Things (IoT) and Vehicle
networking.
Next step of work is to improve re-keying method to be more effective. While the
proposed protocol’s re-keying method is efficient compared to other methodology, it is
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possible to make a more efficient re-keying process by reducing communication numbers,
or by changing the re-keying method to another method.
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